CDL zìtǐ shùjùkù bāohán chāoguò 100000 ge zìfú. Shǐyòng CDL biǎoshì Zhōngwén bìng méiyǒu shùliàng hé fùzá dù de xiànzhì. CDL JavaScript kù shūchū chún SVG lùjìng zìfúchuàn, yǐbiàn wánquán kòngzhì CDL zìfú zài yìngyòng chéngxù hé wǎngzhàn shǐyòng de fāng fāngmiàn miàn. Kāifā tuánduì de guānjiàn chéngyuán David Chanin pínglùn dào: "CDL JavaScript kù wèi wǎngyè duān hé yídòng duān yìngyòng chéngxù kāifā rényuán kāichuàng xìngdì shíxiànle qīngsōng jiāng wénzì bǐhuà dònghuà hé jiāohù shì wénzì shūxiě cèshì tiānjiā dào yìngyòng chéngxù zhōng. Wénlín CDL JavaScript kě miǎnfèi shǐyòng, xū zūnzhào AGPL kāiyuán xǔkě. Shìyòng yú “bì yuán xiàngmù” de Wénlín CDL JavaScript qǐng liánxì [email protected] huòdé xǔkě. Chákàn wǒmen de fúwù tiáokuǎn, liǎojiě xiángqíng. Ruòyào shǐyòng Wénlín CDL JavaScript, qǐng diǎnjī cǐchù.
The last two sections show some potential changes in the dominant path of media convergence adopted by the local press industry. Existing studies indicate that institutional and organisational factors considerably influence the journalists’ perception of their professional roles (Tao and Zhang, 2014; Wu et al., 1996; Zhang and Wu, 2016). Long-term attention is equally worthwhile with regard to whether the future structural adjustment of the local press industry in the area of media convergence will change the journalists’ identification of their roles.
The first phase of China’s media reform, that is, the marketisation of Chinese media, began when the State Administration of Publication on the National Press Managers’ Conference officially announced in December 1978 the decision to pursue the business operation of newspapers. Accordingly, a media system with Chinese characteristics, that is, the ‘enterprise management of institutions’, was established. In 1983, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated Document No. 37 to encourage business operation within media organisations.

Wo zài yù zhong èrshísì xiaoshí, ránhòu huòzhun baoshì. Lín dá cóng jiali zoule. Dang ta yitianhòu hé ta liánxì, ta shuo ta xiang huí dào shènglùyìsi. Wo de fángjian, zàixiàmiàn dì dìban shàng de rán mù lúzi jiarè, tài lengle, bùnéng zài nàliguò dongtian. Lín dá huí dàole yigè qián nán péngyou. Si hòu, ta ban dàole danfú, zuìhòu jiéhunle yigè wéi dàxíng zuzhi zuò diànnao gongzuò de báirén. Tamen xiànzài zhù zài la si wéi jia si, lín dá zài zhoulì dàxué danrèn jiàoxué zhíwù.
The historical course of China’s media reform is coincidental with the intrinsic logic of the transformation in national political ideology from contradiction theory to economy-centric theory (Li and Hu, 2013). However, this situation does not mean that political determinism would suffice to explain the China’s media reform. The transformation towards media groups did not result in mere innovation in the size, structure and managerial ideal of the media industries but also the ‘self-consciousness’ of actively promoting economic gains and the tendency to transform capitalism, ownership and other concepts into the reasonable kernel of media reform (Li and Hu, 2013). These have transcended far beyond the scope of what ‘political correctness’ can explain.
Zhèxie qiánghuà shèbèi you zhù yú jiànlì kouqiang wénhuà. Zhè zhong wénhuà duìyú yíshì xìng biaoxiàn de zhongshí dù you hen gao de yaoqiú. Bìxu jì zhù yiqiè de rén fà zhan chu baoshou de xintài, bù yuàn jieshòu xuyào bù xuéxí hé chóngxin xuéxí mou xie shìwù de biànhuà. Kàn qilái yigè zérèn, bìxu jì zhù suoyou zhèxie zhishì, ér bù qiúzhù yú xiezuò. Lìng yi fangmiàn, zhishì biàn de gèngjia gèrén huà, bìngqie zài jìyì zhong baoliú ér bùshì zài zhi shàng biaodá shí geng mìqiè. Zài yuánshi wénhuà yi zongjiào wéi zhongxin de chéngdù shàng, mei zhong yíshì huò jìyì xíngwéi dou chéngwéi yi zhong jiang rén yu zuxian de líng hé shén liánxì qilái de daogào. Zài zhèyàng de wénhuà zhong youyigè shèqu jingshén, shìzì shèhuì quefá. Zhè zhong lèixíng de jìyì zài jingshén shàng bi yóu shují zuchéng de wénhuà lèixíng gèng qiángdà hé gèng fengfù, suirán ta ye kenéng shì yi zhong xiàol? jiào di de baocún zhishì de fangshì.
The press groups in Fujian have adopted the extendedly ameliorated path of media convergence. Firstly, they hired a technology company to establish a platform for converging news production. Secondly, a new media centre was established. Thirdly, a group of editors from the press newsroom were transferred to the centre to handle the new media outlets, particularly the website, Weibo, Wechat and APP. Lastly, a process reconstruction of the news production was undertaken by uniformly importing information from multiple sources into the centre for processing and delivering to new media outlets.
Meanwhile, partisans of the Donglin Academy faction, which had been devastated under Wei Zhongxian's influence, established political organizations throughout the Jiangnan region.[5] Chief among these was the Fushe, or Restoration Society, whose members were a new generation of scholars who identified with the old Donglin faction.[6] They succeeded in placing their members into high government posts through the imperial examinations of 1630 and 1631. The reversal of Wei Zhongxian's fortunes resulted in a renewal of the Donglin faction's influence at court, arousing great suspicion from the Chongzhen Emperor.[7] The nomination of Donglin favorite Qian Qianyi for the post of Grand Secretary led to accusations of corruption and factionalism by his rival Wen Tiren. Qian Qianyi was imprisoned on the emperor's orders. Though he was soon released, his status was reduced to that of a commoner and he returned to Jiangnan. Wen Tiren would later become Grand Secretary himself.[8]

Zài zhongguó zhi xíng zhong, wo céng wènguò youyi míng wèihun mèimei de daoyóu, shìfou you kenéng huì yùjiàn yi míng zhongguó nuzi wéi hunyin mùdì. Zhè zhishì yigè cháxún. Dangrán, wo háishì hé xila jiéhun, dàn wèntí zàiyú women de guanxì fazhan. Zhongguó daoyóu hòulái chéngwéi tiánnàxi dàxué zài chá ta nu jia de xuésheng. Zài shenghuó zài zhège chéngshì de shíhòu, ta zài yigè shèjiao jùhuì shàng yù dàole yigè zhongguó nurén, ta shuo jiejie you xìngqù jià gei yigè meiguó rén. Zhè jiùshì wo yù dàole wo de dì san rèn qizi. Daoyóu da diànhuà gei wo, hé wo liánxì de jiejie, ta xiàng wo fasòngle yigè hen kuài chéngwéi wo qizi de nurén de liánxì fangshì. Zài yóujiàn liánxì bùjiu zhihòu, wo anpái zài beijing bàifang ta.
Wo de fánnao yuan yuan méiyou jiéshù. Wèntí zàiyú,Ashley de xiao gongyù li ji manle ta de cáiwù. Yixie wùpin rú yifú shì heisè sùliào dài. Qíta de rén dui zài dìban shàng. a shén lì yeyou dà jiàn jiajù, tèbié shì yigè hòuzhòng de mù zhuo, bìxu zhòngliàng yibai bàng. Zài héfa dì dìfang, yèzhu bèi yaoqiú zuyòng chu wù guì, yibiàn zài zulìn danwèi bèi chaichú hòu, jiang bèi quzhú de zuhù de wùpin baoliú liùshí tian. Rúguo zhifù cúnchú chéngben, zuhù keyi suíhòu shouhuí wùpin. Dànshì, fángdong ye yào zhifù zuche, zhifù gongrén jiazài kache bìng bangzhù banjia.
Ho Khai Leong 何启良 (ed.).  Kuangzheng yu liubian: Malaixiya huaren lishi yu renwu zhengzhipian 匡正与流变:马来西亚华人历史与人物政治篇 (Malaysian Chinese History and Personalities: The Political Elites). Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, 2003; Hou Kok Chung  何国忠(ed.), Jicheng yu jueze: Malaixiya huaren lishi yu renwu wenhuapian 继承与抉择:马来西亚华人历史与人物文化篇 (Malaysian Chinese History and Personalities: The Intellectual Elites). Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, 2003; Lim Chooi Kwa 林水豪 (ed.), Chuangye yu hugen: Malaixiya huaren lishi yu renwu rushangpian 创业与护根:马来西亚华人历史与人物儒商篇 (Malaysian Chinese History and Personalities: The Entrepreneurial Elites). Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, 2003.   In Xin Jiyuan Xueyuan xuebao 新纪元学院学报 (New Era College Academic Journal) Vol. 2 (April 2005): 169-171.
wo jiang zhège gùshì, wo yiqián méiyou gàosù rènhé rén, yinwèi yu zhulì'an yiqi dùguò de shíjian huànqile wo dì xìngyù. Wo yizhí zài xìng xíngwéi, fanduì fei huódòng. Dànshì zài zhèli, wo shì yigè 69 suì de nánzi, zhuizhú yi míng 20 suì de nuzi, ta shì yi míng gaozhong lánqiú míngxing. Women you bùtóng de zhongzú hé wénhuà bèijing. Rán'ér, zhulì'an sìhu zhèngzài jieshòu wo zuòwéi yigè wèilái de nán péngyou. Làngmàn de ganjué bèi ourán de qián yaoqiú nòng luànle. Zìcóng zhulì'an yilái, zhè bùshì qián, ér shì wo cónglái méiyou zuò'ài. Dànshì, rúguo wo shuo wo xiang yào yigè háizi, ta zhidào wo de yìsi. Ta xianrán méiyou faxiàn zhège páichì.
Yousan gè zhèyàng de zuhù. Wo zài tóngyi tian xiàwu xiàng tamen fachule quzhú tongzhi. Yi míng míng jiào jími de heisè zu kè, zhànjùle dàlóu de dì yi gongyù, xianrán shì yi míng dúfàn. Wo jingcháng kàn dào ta zhàn zài jiejiao, bàngqiú mào zhuan guòtóu lái, ràng gè zhong gè yàng de rén yi lèisì shengyì de jiaotán fangshì jìnxíng jiaoliú. Jími shì dàibu jìlù de rén zhi yi. Wo xiàle ta de danwèi, qiao mén, dì gei ta de quzhú tongzhi, jieshì shuo wo zhèngzài quzhú dàibu jìlù de rén.
The Chongzhen Emperor (Chinese: 崇禎; pinyin: Chóngzhēn; 6 February 1611 – 25 April 1644), personal name Zhu Youjian (Chinese: 朱由檢; pinyin: Zhū Yóujiǎn), was the 17th and last Emperor of the Ming dynasty as well as the last Han Chinese to reign as Emperor of China. He reigned from 1627 to 1644. "Chongzhen," the era name of his reign, means "honorable and auspicious".
Dang alán da diànhuà gàosù a shén lì da diànhuà gei mìxixibi zhou de shíhòu, wo yijing anpáile yigè chu wù guì, wèn ta de bànlu zhulì'an shìfou keyi ba ta de yixie wùpin ná zou. Dangrán, wo tóngyìle. Zhulì'an shanchú de yiqiè dou shì wo bùbì qù cúnchú de dongxi. Suoyi wo ràng ta huí dào gongyù li ba Ashley de yifú fàng zài dàizi li. Dang ta líkai dàizi de shíhòu, ta wèn ta shìfou keyi zài yitian nèi huílái zài ná yixie wùpin. Wo ye tóngyìle.

Chéngwéi fùmu de gèng zìrán de fangshì shì bùyào dengdào qishí niándài, yào cóng gaozhong huò dàxué jiéhun xinxian, ránhòu kaishi sheng háizi. Chéngwéi yigè fùqin, birú 20 suì huò 25 suì, hái you yigè 50 suì de yéyé, zhè bùshì yigè bi gaibiàn shenghuó èrshí nián de niàobù gèng hao de zhuyì ma? Dangrán shì zhèyàng, dàn mìngyùn bìng méiyou ràng wo zhème zuò. Zhen de, wo zìji chulile zhè jiàn shì.


Both viewpoints have consistent cores, that is, the adherence to the principle that ‘content shall dominate’, which underscores the importance of content resources in maintaining and promoting the influential power of newspapers and in assisting newspapers to step out of the ‘cold winter’. This situation further evokes the hesitation of and the resistance from the journalists of the Fujian press industry as they maintain their professional dignity with effort.
Contextualised within the relationship of state, media and journalists, the current study begins with a brief description of local journalists’ attitude towards new media. Thereafter, the authors discuss how local journalists perceive and evaluate media convergence, disclosing the implementation of the dominant convergence path and its influential mechanism. Consequently, this discussion lays an empirical foundation for exploring the regional diversity of China’s media convergence in the future. The following concrete questions will be discussed:
a shén lì gàosù wo, ta huì qù mìxixibi qù bàifang ta de fùqin. Ta de héhuo rén zhulì'an jiang tóngshí zhànling gongyù. Wo danxin zhège gongyù de wèi jing shòuquán de jiaofù gei yigè bùzhi míng de rén. Wo jianchí zhulì'an tiánxie shenqing, bìng zài jieshòu shenqing zhiqián bèi jieshòu. Dànshì, hái you zujin de wèntí. 2 Yuè 27 rì, wo gei a shén lì yi feng xìn, yaoqiú ta qianyue, bìng zài líkai mìxixibi zhiqián zhifù èr yuè de zujin, fouzé wo huì qugan ta. a shén lì shì fènnù de wo xià zhouyi dào fatíng tíchu quzhú.
We next wondered if 3K3A-APC could lower DPR levels in vivo. Baloh and colleagues previously generated C9-BAC mice that harbor a human C9ORF72 gene containing 100–1000 GGGGCC repeats and produce DPRs that aggregate in neurons (36). Forty-eight hours after direct injection into the hippocampus, 3K3A-APC–injected hippocampi showed a significant reduction in poly(GR)+, poly(PR)+, and poly(GP)+ punctae (Figure 6, A–D). Thus, in vivo, 3K3A-APC can reduce levels of both nuclear and cytoplasmically localized DPRs, as well as sense- and antisense-transcript-derived DPRs.

Wúlùn shì zhongzú háishì qíta yuányin, wo de fùmu dou bù zànchéng wo yu xila de hunyin. Wo de muqin anpái wo de dìdì an dí hé 1960 nián bìyè de ai kè sai tè zhunbèi xuéxiào de yiqún xiàoyou yiqi qù zhongguó luxíng. ai kè sai tè bìyè sheng de luxíng tuán dangshí shì meiguó zhù huá dàshi de tian'anmén guangchang dà túsha. Wo bèi yaoqiú péibàn an dí, yi quèbao ta fúyòng ta di yàowù. Zhè cì luxíng yú 1996 nián 4 yuèdi kaishi, chíxùle san gè xingqí. Dang wo huí dào míng ní abo lì si shí, xila hé háizimen yiqi zoule, hái you dà píngmù diànshì hé qíta de cáiwù. Dang wo da diànhuà gei shànghai, méiyou rén huídá de shíhòu, wo you yigè zhèyàng de qíngkuàng.
Wo zuìhòu yicì yu zhulì'an dì huìmiàn hen qíguài. Zhè shì zài 2011 nián 2 yuè de dì èr gè xingqí. Ji gè yuè li, wo hái méiyou kàn dào ta, ye méi ting shuoguò ta. Ta kenéng yijing qùle dé kè sà si zhou yiduàn shíjian. Wúlùn rúhé, dang wo shuìzhe de shíhòu, wo zaochén 3 dian cái jie dào diànhuà. Zhulì'an ràng wo zài gelúnbiya gaodì, dàyue wushí hé zhongyang dàdào yùjiàn ta. Ta shuo ta xuyào cóng nàli dào ta muqin zài shèngbaoluó dì dìfang. Qichu wo shuo “bù”le. Wo bùzàihu nàme qingxing de daraole. Dànshì bìjìng shì zhulì'an. Wo da diànhuà shuo wo huì zài nàli.
Xiong, S. (2012). Jiyu wangluo huanjing de daxuesheng yuyan xuexi jiaolv yu xuexi celue shiyong zhi guanxi yanjiu [A study on the relationship between language learning anxiety and learning strategy use of university students in the computer-based environment]. Waiyu Dianhua Jiaoxue [Computer-Assisted Foreign Language Education in China], 6, 66–71.Google Scholar
5 See, for example, Li, C.-c., Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York: Guilford Press, 1990); Lynch, D.C., After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Esarey, A., “Cornering the market: state strategies for controlling China's commercial media,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), pp. 37–83; Zhao, Y., Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Polumbaum, J. and Lei, X., China Ink: The Changing Face of Chinese Journalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
Ránhòu lìng yi tào jìshù chuxiànle. Tongguò shèying, xiàoxiànghuà jia zài huàbù shàng baochí miànbù túxiàng de youyòng xìng xùnsù bianzhí. Jiqì nénggòu chansheng bi zuìgao jìshù de yìshùjia gèng hao de duìxiàng de xiàoxiàng. Dang liúshengji hé diànying zhàopiàn chuxiàn shí, guanzhòng bàolù zài geshou huò yanyuán de lian hé shengyin de gè rén sùzhì. Bùjiu yiqián, wénhuà zhùyì lì cóng yigè xìjù jù zuòjia de zuòqu jia huò zuòjia suo xie de wénzì zhuanyí dào yanzòu zhe rúhé jieshì huò chéngxiàn zhèyàng de zuòpin. Zhiyou shaoshù chúncuì zhuyì zhe zhidào huò guanxin bianjù zài diànying zhong de zuòpin huò zuòqu jia zài chuàngzuò yinyuè fangmiàn de zuòyòng, shi yixie liúxíng geshou chéngwéi míngxing.
By this point, the situation had become critical for the Chongzhen Emperor, who rejected proposals to recruit new militias from the Beijing region and to recall general Wu Sangui, the defender of Shanhai Pass on the Great Wall. The Chongzhen Emperor had dispatched a new field commander, Yu Yinggui, who failed to stop Li Zicheng's armies as they crossed the Yellow River in December 1643. Back in Beijing, the capital defence forces consisted of old and feeble men, who were starving because of the corruption of eunuchs responsible for provisioning their supplies. The troops had not been paid for nearly a year.[15] Meanwhile, the capture of Taiyuan by Li Zicheng's forces gave his campaign additional momentum; garrisons began to surrender to him without a fight. Through February and March 1644, the Chongzhen Emperor declined repeated proposals to move the court south to Nanjing, and in early April, he rejected a suggestion to move the crown prince to the south.[16]
Dang wo zài yijiujiu'èr nián liù yuè de gé lún wudé dàjie 1702 hào gòumai fángwu shí, wo zhidào wo zài mai shénme fángzi. Zhège wùyè hen piányí, dànshì wo ba henduo qián dou hái gei bèi chaichú de tóng guan, bìng chéngbao qíta de gongzuò. Wánchéng. Yi nián yihòu, zài yijiujiusan nián ba yuè, wo zài gébì gòumaile yigè dúpin jiu tào fángwu. Bùguò, wo yi 72,000 meiyuán de jiàgé gòumaile zhè zuò jiànzhú, róngzi yibàn, bìng qiandìng qìyue.
5 See, for example, Li, C.-c., Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York: Guilford Press, 1990); Lynch, D.C., After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Esarey, A., “Cornering the market: state strategies for controlling China's commercial media,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), pp. 37–83; Zhao, Y., Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Polumbaum, J. and Lei, X., China Ink: The Changing Face of Chinese Journalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
Wúlùn shì zhongzú háishì qíta yuányin, wo de fùmu dou bù zànchéng wo yu xila de hunyin. Wo de muqin anpái wo de dìdì an dí hé 1960 nián bìyè de ai kè sai tè zhunbèi xuéxiào de yiqún xiàoyou yiqi qù zhongguó luxíng. ai kè sai tè bìyè sheng de luxíng tuán dangshí shì meiguó zhù huá dàshi de tian'anmén guangchang dà túsha. Wo bèi yaoqiú péibàn an dí, yi quèbao ta fúyòng ta di yàowù. Zhè cì luxíng yú 1996 nián 4 yuèdi kaishi, chíxùle san gè xingqí. Dang wo huí dào míng ní abo lì si shí, xila hé háizimen yiqi zoule, hái you dà píngmù diànshì hé qíta de cáiwù. Dang wo da diànhuà gei shànghai, méiyou rén huídá de shíhòu, wo you yigè zhèyàng de qíngkuàng.

B. Wang Lilin. “Xuzhou Han huaxiangshi yanjiuzhong gongren xianxiang de zai renshi” (A Reconsideration of Generally Acknowledged Phenomena in the Study of Han Stone Pictorial Reliefs at Xuzhou) in Xuzhou bowuguan sanshinian jinian wenji (30th Anniversary Commemorative Edition of Collected Works of The Xuzhou Museum). (Beijing: Yanshan chubanshe, 1992), 166.

Wo faxiàn zài hùliánwang shàng jingcháng bàolù sèqíng nèiróng, xueruòle wo shíshí zhíxíng de nénglì. Wo huì yijiànzhongqíng, yigè luoti de nurén, dàn wo de yinjing huì hen kuài biàn ruan. Yexu zhè shì niánlíng de jiéguo. Wo cónglái méiyou shiyòng weige huò lèisì di yàowù. Bùguò, wo ye rènwéi, dang wo zài sèqíng wangzhàn shàng huafèi gèng duo de shíjian shí, wo duì zhenzhèng xìngyù de kewàng jiànjiàn xiaoshi. Zhè kenéng shì yinwèi hùliánwang túxiàng zài qínggan shàng manzúle wo. Zhège jinglì chéngle xiànshí de tìdài pin. Rúguo wo yi lìng yi zhong fangshì huòdé manzú, jiù bù zài keqiú xìng xíngwéile.


It is said that even in his lifetime a few of Wang’s characters or his signature were priceless. Down through the ages, aspiring students of that most basic yet highest art in China, calligraphy, have copied and preserved traces of his style. The most famous example of his writing is the Lantingxu (“Preface to the Poems Composed at the Orchid Pavilion”), which recorded a famous gathering of some 42 literary figures during the Spring Purification Festival of 353 ce to compose poems and enjoy the companionship of wine. Wang’s work was written in the xingshu, or “running script,” and has become the model for that particular style of writing. Among other generations of calligraphers in the family, Wang Xianzhi (344–386 ce), the youngest son of Wang Xizhi, was the most famous.
J.K.I. and P.A. are co-founders of Acurastem, Inc. P.A. is an employee of Icagen Corporation. J.K.I. and P.A. declare that they are bound by confidentiality agreements that prevent them from disclosing details of their financial interests in this work. S.-J.L. is a founder of DRVision Technologies and T.-Y.C. is an employee of DRVision Technologies. A.Z. and J.A.C. are co-founders of Verge Genomics and A.Z., V.H.-S., N.W. and T.G.B. are employees of Verge Genomics.
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